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guring No n - refo ul e m e n t /
The Suresh ,D ecision,'Security
Relatiuism' , and the International
Human Rights Imperatiue

Re

- c onft

OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR* AND PIUS LEKWUWA

oKoRoNKWO* *
lVe conclude that gmcra@ to deport a refugee, where there are grounds to believe that
this would subject the refugee to a substantial risk of torture, would unconstitutionally
violate the Chartey's s.7 guarantee of life, liberty and security of the penon. This said, raa
possibiliE that in an exceptional casc such a deportation nighl bcjustificd either in
the balancing approach under ss.7 or I of the Charler.'
. . . we find that Suresh made a primafacic showing that he might be tortured on return

leaue opm the

if expelled to Sri Lanka.2

Abstract
This article critically analyses the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
with regard to its underlying basis in doctrine and policy, and its

Suresh case, especially
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implications for the non-rcfoulemen, norm. The principal conclusions of this article are as
follows. In the first place, laudable as it mostly is, the Szresi decision is based on a
number of apparently credible, although flawed, images of certain important policy
and doctrinal assumptions and constructs. The decision relies on a conception of the
because its
desiderata for Canadian national security that is {lawed on two scores
- reassuring
conception of security interdependence is so overly lormalist as to be hardly
to those in fear of terrorism and other such threats. The decision relies on an image
eng that sees
of torture (and deportation) to torture that is relativist and pragmalig
one that
torture as something that can be balanced away by a national security -risk
is thus unsatisfactory from an international human rights perspective. The decision also
relies on specific images of near absolute state sovereignty and weak international
images that constrained its decision in unsatislactory ways. It
normative authority
also relies on a much -too benign image of the Canadian irnmigration bureaucracy, onc
that allowed it to eflectively allow an unsatisfactorily very high level of hard-to-review
discretion to rhat entity. Secondly, these {lawed images worked together to lead the
court to conclusions that will in practice nol ensure that the vast majority of refugees
and other persons at risk of torture are nlt deported to places where they face a
substantial risk of torture. Consequently, a critical analysis of the nature of Canada's
post-Surrri decision non-reJoulemeal regime reveals that that regime still falls short of the
requirements of the general norm that prohibits deportations to torture (especially in its
likely practical operation).

1. Introduction
OnJanuary I l, 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada released four decisions concerning the legality of the attempts made by Canada to deport
certain non-citizens lrom Canada." Two of those decisions concern the
deportation, on national security grounds, of convention refugees to
places where they would likely face a substantial risk of torture.* The
more important of these two decisions was rendered in the Sureshcase.5

This last decision will have extremely important implications for
Canada's protection of refugees and persons at risk, and for the ability
of Canada to refoule (that is, deport to a place where they are at risk)
persons who have already been accepted as convention refugees in
Canada, or who otherr,r,ise remain at risk of persecution in the place
to n,hich they are deportable. It may also have some persuasive value in
the courts of other refugee-rcceiving countries.o In any event, this
3

See Srresl, n. I above; tr|ansoar Ahani a Canada ( A,tinisrer of Ciizenship and Immigration 2002
SCC 2. File No.: 27792 (hercafter 'r\hani'); Chieu a Canada ( A'Iinister of Citi<enship and lmmigration)
2002 SCC 3. File No.: 27107; and Al Sagban r Canada (l'tinister oJCitiaenship and Immigration) 2002
SCC 4. F-ile No.: 27ll l.
+ See Saresi. n. I above anel ,4lani. ibid.
5 rtrid.
o 'fh.
aouat, o[ the major lrfestern relugec receiving states oftcn cross-rcferencc each othcrs
decisions. For instance, in Suresh, the Suprerne Court o[Canada rvas persuaded bv much of the
a decision ol thc
reasoning in Secrelar7 of ,Statefor Home l)epartment t Rehmtn [200 I ] 3 W.I-. R. 877

British House of l.,ords.
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decision has extremely important implications ficr the way convention
refugees and asylum seekers are treated not just in Canada, but the
world over as well, especially in our current post-g/ll world order.'
Given its importance and topicality, it is crucial that much scholarly
not just in terms of understanding
attention be paid to this decision
its doctrinal and other basis, but also in terms of appreciating more fully
its broader implications.
Our overarching objectives in this article are two-fold. First of all, we
will examine the Suresh decision closely, especially its more important
aspects, with a view to understanding and articulating the various
images (and thus understandings) of certain aspects of social reality
and a number of specific socio-legal constructs that the decision either
prders or displaces, and to consider the various ways in which this underlying process of image preference and displacement was constitutive of
the conclusions reached by the court, in the sense that it functioned to
shape and produce a particular outcome, and to construct that outcome as the right answer
the only viable legal position. In particular,
we will focus on the images of Canadian national security, torture, the
authority of international legal norms, state sovereignty, and the workings of the Canadian Immigration bureaucracy, that are developed,
preferred, and relied on in the decision, as well as on those alternative
images of these same phenomena and constructs that are thereby displaced. We will attempt to expose the contingency of this underlying
process of image preference and displacement by developing and
articulating viable alternatives to the images that the court preferred
to privilege. Here, our broad argument is that it was only by a subtle
and sophisticated process that involved the largely unjustified displacement of other viable alternative images of the relevant phenomena and
constructs that the court was able to construct the kind of decision that
it reached eventually
a decision that, laudable as it mostly is, did not
go nearly as far as it could in the direction of entrenching the expanded
(anti-tortu re) non-refoulement norm in Canadian law; a decision that,
was disappointing as a result.
This analytical exposE will form the basis for our second overarching
pre-occupation in this article: i.e our attempt to articulate the nature of
Canada's emergent (non-) refoulement regime (especially as it relates to
already accepted convention relugees), and predict the likely outcomes,

' Fo. un excellent commentary on the nature o[ the emerging global order, see U. Baxi,
'Opcration "Enduring Freedom": Towards a New International Law and Order?' in A. Anghie,
et al. eds., The Third lilorld and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (The Hague: Kluwer
notinginler alia that'the Clio's couch, the disengagement that
Law International, ficrthcoming)
only distance can bring, is not for us the gilt of time'.

in the vast majority of cases, of the practical application of the formal
legal norms and rules that constitute that emergent regime. Thus, we
will attempt to specily in outline the nature of the conceptual framework for, and likely practical implementation of, the emergent nonrdoulement regime in Canada
especially as it relates to deportations

- is that in concrete terrns, the decision
to torture. Here, our contention
will turn outnot to be critically transformative of the pre-existing (and
rather unsatisfactory) Canadian non-refoulement regime. The decision
will not turn out to be transformative, at least in the sense that as
a result of an odd calculus of conclusions reached in the decision and
the nature of the current security climate in Canada, far too many
refugees could still be deported to places where they face a substantial
risk of torture.
At the outset, however, it is important to acknowledge and recognize
the fact that in the context of the mass public outrage that followed
the terrible events that occurred in the USA on September 11,2001,
and the accompanying (and somewhat understandable,) rise in the level
of security related hysteria in Canada as elsewhere8 and given the
earlier dismissal of Mr Suresh's appeal by the Federal Court of Appeal
of Canada, the Supreme Court's decision in this case is likely to be
welcomed with much relief by most refugees, refugee advocates, and
refugee lawyers. The court displayed, yet again, its remarkable ability
to manoeuvre quite effectively between ethical principle and popular
politics, between a commitment to normative supremacy, and the
understandable allure of pragmatic (security-related) relativism,
while reducing to the barest minimum public censure of its decisionmaking." The happy practical result in the present case will most likely
be some reduction in the ability of Canada's Immigration bureaucracy
to deport relugees to places where they face a substantial risk of torture.
That is not to say, however, that the court's reasoning is unassailable, at
least from the point of vier,r, of those minded to advance the best
interests of refugees. Indeed, as we will show toward the end of this
paper, in concrete terms) the decision stopped lar short of ensuring that
tlre deportation of relugees and other persons at risk to torture would
now be a thing of the past.

I

Fo. irrst^.,cc, see'Iranspori Carrada,'Covernmcnt of Canacla introduces Pul>lic Safetv Act'
on.line: http://wwrr,.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/rclcases/nat/2001/01_hl47e.htm
(visitcd: l4/03/2002).
" F-or a good example of this kind of behaviour, see Re.' llcference by the Gouernor in Council
Concerning cerlain questions relating lo the Secession o-[ Qtebec from Canada (1998), 16l D.l-.R.
(4th series) 385.

2. The background and nature of the decisiont0
In 1991, the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Imrnigration and Refugee Board of Canada recognized Mr Manickavasagam Suresh as a convention refugee. Under Canadian law, the
recognition of Suresh as a convention refugee entitled him to apply
for landed immigrant or permanent residence status in Canada. In the
summer of that same year, Suresh made that application.
The application was in process for four years and was never finalized.
This was because in late 1995, the Solicitor General of Canada (who
oversees the security services) and the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (who oversees the department of citizenship and immigration or CIC)" issued a certificate under Section 40.1 of the then
iperative l97B Immigration Act of Canadar2 alleging that Suresh
could not be granted permanent residence status and was inadmissible
in Canada on security grounds pursuant to Section 19 of that same Act.
The certificate alleged that Suresh was a high-ranking member of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) otherwise known as the
Tamil Tigers. The certificate also alleged that Suresh was a fundraiser
for the LTTE and functioned in that capacity in Canada under the
auspices of the World Tamil Movement. The LTTE, an organization
composed of members of the Tamil minority ethnic group in Sri Lanka,
was engaged in an armed struggle against the "democratically elected
government' of that country. The certificate further alleged that the
LTTE is a terrorist organization, and that Suresh's fundraising activities supported the activities of that group.
As required under Canadian law, this security certificate was filed in
the Federal Court of Canada in order to determine its reasonableness.
As aresult, Suresh was arrested and detained on October lB, 1995. In
1997, Teitelbaum,J. of the Federal Court (Trial Division) upheld this
certificate as reasonable. He found that Suresh was a top member of the
LTTE; that the LTTE has committed terrorist acts; and that Tamils,
such as Suresh, who are arrested by the Sri Lankan authorities, are
sometimes subjected to torture by the security agencies.
At the deportation hearing that followed, an adjudicator found that
although there were no reasonable grounds to conclude that Suresh was

directly engaged in terrorism, he ought to be deported since, in the
adjudicator's view, he was a member of a terrorist organization.
In early 1998, after considering the pro-deportation recommendation of an immigration officer who had also concluded that Mr Suresh
l0 M,l.h (butnotall) ofthematerialincludedin

thissectionisgleaned trom the judgmentof the
Supreme Court in this case. See Suresi, n. I above at paras 7-23.
It Hereinafter referred to as'the Minister'.
12
See Inmigration Act 1976-77, c.52, s. I (Hereinafter referred to as'the old Act').

of torture upon return to Sri Lanka, the Minister issued an
opinion under section 53(1)(b) of the old Act declaring that Suresh
constituted a danger to the security of Canada, and ordering his
deportation. The o{ficer had considered Suresh's submissions before
making the recommendation. However, prior to the Minister's decision, Suresh had not been provided with a copy of the officer's memorandum to the Minister nor was he given an opportunity to respond to
the oflicer's conclusion.
Section 53(l)(b) otthe old Act (and Section lJ5(2) (u) (b) of the
current Immigration and ReJugee Proteclion Act of 200l'') had permitted the
Minister to order the deportation of a convention relugee who an
adjudicator had lound to be a member of a terrorist organization;
against whom a Section 40.1 (national security risk) certificate had
been issued and found reasonable by a judge of the Federal Court, and
against whom the Minister had issued an,opinion declaring her or him
to be a danger to the security of Canada.'*
Thus, at this point, Suresh would have been deported to Sri Lanka
forthwith had he not applied immediately to the Federal Court for
judicial review of the deportation order that had been made against
him.'" Suresh alleged that the Minister's decision was unreasonable;
that the relevant deportation procedures under the old Act were unfair;
and that, inter alia, the old Act was unconstitutional, in the sense that it
violated Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedo*r.'u
I\4cKeown, J. acknowledged Suresh's argument that the analysis of
the requirements o[ fundamental justice under Section 7 must be
info.rmed by international law, especially the Conuention Against Torturett (which prohibits in absolute terms the deportation of any person
to a place where s/he faced a substantial risk of torture). Flowever, the
court concluded that (a) Suresh had not shown that he laced a substantial risk of torture if deported to Sri Lanka; and (b) given the risk
posed to Canadian national security by Suresh, his deportation to
a place where he is likely to be tortured rvould not 'shock the conscience' of Canadians. The court therefore dismissed Suresh's application for judicial rcview.
f,aced a risk

f]
'*

Se.rtte ImmigrationantlRefugee ProtectionAct,S.C.2O0l ,c.27 (hereinalterthe'newr\ct').

S.53 ( I ) (b) of thc olcl act provides rhat: ' . . . rhe pe rson is a mernber o[ an inadmissible class
described in para. l9(l ) (e), (f), (g), 0), (k), or (l) and thc rninistcr is ofthe opinion that the person
constitutes a danger to the securitv ofCanada'.
t.l Suresh ffe
1t6SZ;, 40 Immigration Larn, Reports (2cl) 247 at 26G-262.
"' Canadian Charur oJ Righls and l;reedom-r on line: http://www.efL.ca/pages/law/charter/charter.

text.html#34 {hereinaftcr'the Chartcr').

t7

Conumtion against Torture and othir Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Trealment or Punishment oJ
1984 rcprinted in Collection oJ Inlernational lnstruments and Olhcr l*gal Texts Concerning

l0 December

Retugees and Displaced Peruozs

Vol.l, Universal Instruments (Geneva: UNHCR,

(hcrcinalier'(he'lorture Convenlion').

1995) 233, article 3

Suresh's appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada was
similarly dismissed.ls Robertson J.A., for the court, held that:
(a) Canada's sovereign right to expel those who pose a security risk
limits the international legal right to be free from torture; (b) the
to the Status of Refugees permitted derogation from
the prohibition against deportation to torture; (c) S.53 (l)(b) of the
old Act was not unconstitutional even though it permitted deportations
to torture; (d) while deportations to torture violated Section 7 of the
Charter, such deportations were saved by Section I of the same document (which permits reasonable and proportional derogations in the
interest of Canadian national security); (e) the expulsion to torture of a
person that posed a danger to Canadian national security would not
violate the sense ofjustice or shock the conscience of most Canadians
because Canada would have acted merely as an involuntary intermediary; and (f) the administrative decision-making process under Section
53(1)(b) conformed with Section 7 of the Charter.
It was from this decision that Suresh appealed to the Supreme Court
of Canada. The court allowed the appeal, overturned the decision of
the Federal Court ofAppeal below, and ordered that a new deportation
hearing before an adjudicator (which must be guided by the court's
reasoning and decision) be convened in respect of Suresh's matter. For
our present purposes, the court found, inter alia, that:
Conuention Relating

(")

According to both Canadian and international law, deportations
to torture will, an general, violate the principles of fundamental
justice as enshrined in Section 7 of the Charter
though in
be justiexceptional circumstances deportations to torture could
fied 'either as a consequence of.the balancing process mandated by
s.7 of the Charter or under s.1."'
(b) The Conuention against Torture absolutely prohibits deportations or
expulsions to torture, and this international law prohibition is at least
'not easily derogab^le', and at most a peremptory norm of general
internal"ional law.t' Moreover, the provisions of th e Rdugee Conuention2t and the International Coaenant on'Ciail and Potitical Righi22 1*hi.h
are not as absolute and explicit in their prohibition of deportations
to torture) cannot be used to deny rights to conve ntion refugees
that other legal instruments confer universally on euerltone.'"

lf Srrrrl u.Canada (Ministerof Citkenshipand Immigration,) [2000J 2F.C.592 (C.A.)'
]] See Surari, n. I above at para. 78.
]0 lUiO. ut purur 6l-66, especially at 66.
"' Conamtion Relating to lhe Status of Refugees,2S July 1951, 189 UNI-S 137, came into lorce
1954 (hereinatter l95l) Arts 32(2) & 33(2).
International Couenant on Ciail and Political Rrgltts (1966) 999 U"r\rIS

22.$pril

"

(lQQ6)
' 23 (entered into force March 23,1976) Arr.7.

3.t

oara.72.

I7l, UN

Doc. A/63
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(c) International treaty norms (including international human rights
norms) are not, strictly speaking, either binding on Canadian
courts or directly applicable within the Canadian legal order,
unless they. have been incorporated into Canadian law by
enactment.2a

(d) In permitting

(.)
(f)

deportations in some exceptional cases to a place
where a convention refugee may lace torture, Section 53(l)(b)
does not therefore necessarily violate Section 7 of the Charter.
The Minister is obliged to apply it in ways that do not violate
the Constitution.
The procedures under Section 53(l)(b) are not fair because they
do not give the prospective deportee an opportunity to know and
meet the case against her or him in circumstances where s/he had
made out a prima lacie case of a substantial risk of torture.
The standard of review by the courts of the Minister's decision to
deport a convention refugee is intended by the Act to be a highly
deferential one. Even if the court would have itself reached
a different conclusion, the courts are not to interfere with the
Minister's decision unless it is patently unreasonable (the most
deferential standard available).

In the subsequent

sections of this article, we will closely examine
a number of thesc conclusions with a view to understanding the logic
that underlie and structure them. Thereafter, we will attempt to fiesh
out the implications of these conclusions for the formal rules and concrete application o[ Canada's emergen t non-refoulement regime.

3. The images of Canadian national security in the
decision
In this section, wc will attempt to tease out and analyse two complementary images of the desiderata for Canadian national security that
are developed in the Suresh decision, and shon' how these images n'orkcd
to displace alternative, and perhaps even tnore realistic, images o[ the
same phenomenon. Here, our primary objective is to articulate the
ways in r.r,hich the images that were prelerred by the court constrained
its overall legal rcasoning and conclusions in ways that are, on the
balance, unsatislactory.
The first imagc of the desiderata firr Canadian national security that
is developed, prelerred, and relied on by thc court is that of security
24 Srrrrh rr. I abovc at
rrara.60.

Q;jte understandably, the court was of the firm view
that 'the security of one country is often dependent on the security of
other nations'.25 It was convinced, and .ightly so in our view, ihat
events that occur elsewhere may still have a negative effect on
Canadian national security; that the global transport and money netinterdependence.

works that feed terrorism or other such security threats have the poten-

tial to touch all counries, and that international

cooperation is
essential in effectively combating terrorisrn.26 However, the court also
recognized that not all threats to the security of another country would
pose a threat to Canada's security. In its view, though the threat to
Canada's security need not always be a direct one, in the envisaged
cases of indirect threats, 'there must be a real and serious possibility of
adverse effect to Canada'.27 In the end though, the image of Cu.ruiiu.t
national security that the court constructed in this portion of its judgment relied too much on an image of the likely human sources of such
threats as indiscriminate purveyors of terrorist violence, who can attack
or otherwise harm an) county whatsoever at any time, necessitating the
need for a country such as Canada to act individually or in common
against any person or group that attacks or is likely to attack an) other
country, lest Canada itself become the next target. While this view
seems reasonable, and is certainly ingrained quite deeply in the conevents
ventional understanding of the events of September I I , 2001
it is
that the court itself relied on in order to construct this image'o
- their
not an altogether unassailable understanding of those events and
context. As understandable and reasonable as this broad view of the
sources of threats to Canadian national security is, it displaces, albeit
subtly, a much more holistic image of the behaviour of the likely sources
of such threats. It displaces an image of such threats as much more
discriminate than indiscriminate. lt tends to occlude history, context, and
reality. In reality, unlortunate as it is, virtually every one of the likely
sources of the anticipated threats to Canadian national security have
historically displayed a tendency to select their targets carefully and
with much discrimination
based on sometimes real and sometimes
imagined (but almost always predictable) historic grievances. For
instance, it will be very difhcult to prove 'a real and serious possibility
of aduerse effect on Canada' of the armed activities of the LTTE, entirely
conducted as they are, within Sri Lanka. The LTTE's sale purpose) as
the court itself acknowledged, is to redress nhat it aiews as Sri Lanka's
repression of its Tamil minority.2e In fact, the bulk of the other evidence
25

26
27
2A

29

Ibid.
Ibid.
tbid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

at para. 90.
at para. 88.
at para. 87.
at para. 10.

suggests that such targets have much more often than not been selected
wii[ real or imagined grievances in mind.'0It -ry of course be argued
in reply that even a highly discriminate strategy on the part of a group
that is viewed as terrorist may still result in an act of terrorism being

perpetrated on Canadian soil even when Canadians are not the targeted group, thereby triggering national security concerns. An example
ofsuch a situation would be if a group such as the LTTE plans to bomb
or bombs the Sri Lankan High Commission in Canada. The example of
the bombing of the USA's Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and the bombing of the Air India jet that killed Canadians, may be offered to
illustrate this point. It is conceded that the enactment o[ such a disturbing scenario is, unfortunately, a possibility. In addition, a loreign
embassy or other entity (that is sited in Canada) may be targeted by
terrorists, thus implicating Canadian national security concerns. Our
argument, however, is that given the relevant historical evidence it is
indeed such groups
rare that such struggles are directed at Canada
- of its comparatively
usually want to enlist Canada as an ally because
more benign image internationally. As such, while such bombings may
occur, the chances are relatively remote. The point is that there is no
necessar) linkage between the conduct of terrorist activities in a foreign
country and the generation of a real risk to Canadian national security.
And so the mere fact that a group is a terrorist group does not czlomaticalQ mean that Canada's national security necessitates the expulsion
of its members lrom Canada. This may well be so in some cases, but the
linkage has to be demonstrated carefully.
Moreover, the image of the desiderata for security interdependence
advanced by the court was an overlyformalist, as opposed to a substantiae,
one. The court did not seem to give much thought to the alternative
view that Canada's security may be much more dependent on a just,
and therefore durable, resolution of certain civil conflicts abroad, and

that such a durable solution will be unlikely i{, by deporting top
members of the armed opposition to the same country that these rebels
fled in fear of persecution, Canada will have effectively intervened in
that civil conflict on the side of the stalus qua, an the side of the very
governments that Canada itself has often viewed as guilty of atrocities
against the rebellious population. However, while a carelul consideration of the reality of our current global circumstance will tend to
weaken severely the specific notion we must add that security interdependence that was relied on so heavily by the court, it does not
completel2 negate it. What is being urged here though is that the court
'o 1..*,, if any, of the activities around the world that are normally viewed as terrorist have beerr
indiscriminate in nature. From the \4iddle East to Chechnya, from lndonesia to Spain, from
Northern Ireland to the Philippines, such activities have been limited scope and definitcly
targeted-oriented in rrature.

relied on an image of security interdependence that was f,ar too decontextualized
a level of reliance that helped significantly to shape
its decision to allow the Minister the authority to order, in exceptional
cases, the deportation to torture of a refugee or other person at risk; a
decision that as we shall soon show is, on balance, unsatisfactory.
Had the court not felt able to rely so heavily on the de-contextualized
image o[ Canadian national security we have articulated already, it
may not have been able to find that Suresh's activities in Canada were
of the kind that could likely pose a proximate danger to the security of
Canada. And even if it still felt that his activities did pose a danger to
Canada's national security, the court may have been more inclined to
view any such potential danger to Canada with less alarm. Again, if the
court had lound that Suresh's fundraising activities, entirely directed as
they were against Sri Lanka, did not fit within the meaning of the
phrase 'danger to the security of Canada', then Suresh would not have
been removable from Canada in the first place, regardless of the answer
to the question of Canada's ability to deport a refugee or other person at
risk to torture. This is because he would not have fitted within the class
of refugees contemplated by Section 53 (l ) (b) of the old Act. As such, by
viewing the likely sources of the anticipated threats to Canada's security in the formalistic way it did, and not in the alternative way already
canvassed, the court itself constrained its own decision in a rather
unsatisfactory direction. This was a very significant, albeit subtle,
argumentative move on the part of the court given the fact that at
least two expert refugee law scholars have suggested that the traaaux
priparatoirer of the Refugee Conuention indicate that threats to the security
af another country do not qualify as a threat to the security of the asylum
state sufficient to allow that state to deport a convention refugee to
tort.rr.. u t
The second image of the desiderata lor Canadian national security
that was relied on as heavily by the court is the notion that a 'fortress
Canada' that is secure and terrorist-proof large\t because of uhat Canada
does or does not do uith its immigrationlrefugee law and policSt is even possible
in the first place. While it was reasonable for the court to suppose, as
most people do, that it is a legitimate objective of immigration/refugee
policy to attempt to do what it can to help secure the country fiom
those who would harm its residents, the court looked lar too kindly upon
the idea that constructing a 'fortress Canada' that is virtually impenetrable to security threats is either practicable or a durable way of
ensuring Canada's national security. In our view, the court relied too
heavily on an alluring but somewhat unrealistic image of the possibility
3t S..
J.C. Hathaway and CJ. Harvey, 'Framing Refugee Protection in The New World
Disorder' i2001) 34 Conell Int'l L. J.257 at 289-290.

of constructing, largely via Canadian immigration/refugee law, policy
and action, a serene, safe fortress Canada devoid of terrorist or other
kinds ofsecurity threats. The court's reliance on the idea that Canada's
national security can be assured largely by keeping out terrorists or other
security threats is evident from its repeated reference in the decision to
Canada's 'legitimate and compelling interest in combating terrorism',
and to 'preventing Canada from becoming a safe haven for terrorists' as
an imperative that might justify deportations to torture in exceptional
cases, an action that would otherwise be impermissible. The discerning
readeris leftwith the impression that thecourtis convinced thatifCanada
does not retain this power to deport refugees to torture, albeit in exceptional cases, then Canada's national security will of necessitl be adversely
aflected. Given the court's strongly expressed aversion in general to the
deportation of refugees and other persons to torture, it is only by reading the court as viewing such deportations as sometimes absolutel2
essential to the worthy project of keeping Canada free from terrorism,
that their willingness to permit them in some cases can make sense.
However, no explicit or implied mention is made in the judgment of
a range of alternative third ua)s that lie between deporting refugees and
other persons at risk of torture, and leaving them completely free in
Canada. Yet it is not that difficult to imagine a number of viable and
credible third way alternatives between those two poles. For instance,
in those cases where evidence of a crime is available, rather than deport
them to torture these persons could be uied, convicted, and imprisoned
as other serious criminals are. The possible reasonable objection to our
argument that these third ways should have guided the court toward
upholding international law's absolute bar on deportations to torture is
that the law can and should never speak in absolutes; that since the larv
cannot possibly see into the future, it should not place an absolute bar on
deportation to torture. In this sense, it is urged that in future there may
arise a case in which a deportation to torture was the onQ wast to save
millions of Canadian lives. While persuasive at first glance, such an
argument is hardly convincing. Trvo responses may be offered in reply.
ln the first place, Canadian larv already speaks in absolutes in relation
to the deportation of a terrorist rn,ho is a Canadian citi<enr. For instance , if
a child \vere to be born in Canada of parents lrom a lbreign country
who are students in Canada, and his parents then take him back to that
foreign country after their studies when he is six months old, if he grows
up to become a terrorist and comes to Canada to live when he is forty
years old, it is impossible under Canadian law to deport him at all,
even more to deport him to torture. Consider that this same person has
a sister who was not born here, and as such is not a Canadian citizen,
but who comes to Canada to live rvith him. The Suresh decision will, in
some cases, allon, this other person to be deported to torture even when

the risk she poses to Canadian national security may not be as serious
as that posed by her sibling who is a Canadian citizen. Thus, in this
case, therrmalitl of her citiaenship and not the seriousness of the ris& that she
poses to Canada's national security is the determining factor as to her
deportation to torture. This is a form of formalism that bears very little
or no relationship to the desiderata for securing Canada from terrorism.
There is no ethical or substantive basis for deporting the one to torture
and not the other
save of course for their different citizenships!
already
speaks in absolutes with regard to certain
Secondly, the law
kinds of serious human rights violations such as genocide. Genocide is
now absolutely barred under international and Canadian law. Would
the court have so easily allowed a window for the state to deport
a person to genocide, even in exceptional cases? As such, the argument
that the law can and should never speak in absolutes is unconvincing as
a justification for allowing the deportation of refugees and persons at
risk of torture. Yet, the credible alternatives to this kind of unhelpful
lormalism (that cannot assure the security of Canadians) are completely
displaced in the court's judgment by their heavy reliance on this rather
unrealistic notion of the possibility of a completely terrorist-free fortress
Canada (that could be largely constructed by Canadian refugee law,
policy and action). T.y as it may, it will become increasingly diflicult
for Canada, or any other country, to prevent an undesired, yet determined, group from arriving and taking up residence within its territory.
Displaced as well, from the court's logic, is the alternative image of
Canadian national security as dependent on the achievement of a more
durable and effective solution to Canada's national security concerns
via Canada's work abroad, as opposed to its actions within its territory.
Canada could do rnuch more than it previously has in helping to find
more just, and therefore more durable, resolutions to the extreme
poverty, frustrating grievances, and violent conflicts that engender

the kinds of threats to national security by which Canada is quite
understandably concerned. These e{forts are much more likely to lead
to more durable solutions to these concerns than any manner of immigration law, policy or action) no matter how draconian or thorough.
Thus, in the broaderscheme of things, and given the alternatives, it
does not seem to be right to imagine, as the court did, that preventing
all deportations to torture would in itself be likely to have a significantly
aduerse impact on the national security of Canada or any other state for
that matter. Yet the court's decision to leave the door open, however
slightly, for Canada to be able to deport refugees and other persons at
risk to torture) is largely founded on the opposite assumption, on the
that is, that to deprive
contrary image of Canadian national security
the Minister of the ability to deport persons at risk to torture will, in
such exceptional cases, necessarilt pose a significant threat to the security

of Canadians. The court's heavy reliance on this contrary image, and
the high level of implied credence it gave to the fortress construction
image of a viable Canadian security policy, inevitably constrained its
legal reasoning and helped in this way to shape its primary conclusion
in the decision. If the court had favoured the alternative images presented here, if the court had realized that deportations to torture could
hardly ever lunction ellectively as an essential Canadian security strategy, and if the court had given credence to the alternative 'third way'
component of between deportations to torture and complete lreedom
for the prospective deportees, it would have been much easier for it to
argue and find in favour of an absolute bar on such deportations under
Canadian law.

+. The image of torture (and deportation to torture)
in the decision
This section, will attempt to tease out and analyse the image of torture
(and deportation to torture) that is preferred and developed in the
Suresh decision as well as the alternative image of that same phenomenon that is thus displaced, albeit in a subtle manner. It will also
attempt to show how the preferred image worked to constrain the
court's legal reasoning and decision, and enabled it to construct
a particular contingent solution to the socio-legal problems posed by
an answer that, in our considered view,
the appeal as the right answer
falls far short of the protection needs of those refugees and other persons
at risk rvho face deportation to torture.
The image of torture that is preferred and developed by the court in
that regards torture as
this decision is a pragmaticalQ relatiaisl one
its
condonation
by Canada
prohibiting
mostly evil without complete|
in certain 'exceptional circumstances' that arise out of a threat to
Canada's nationalsecurity. This rnuch is evident lrom a careful analysis
of the court's reasoning. The court started out by expressing quite
strongly its firrn conviction that torture, horrific a practice as it is,
ought to be, and is indeed, rejected in the absolute sense in Canada.
For instance, the court felt able to state that:

lt can be conlidently stated that Canadians do not accept torture as fair or
compatible with justice. Torture finds no condonation in our CriminaL Code;
indeed the Code prohibits it. The Canadian people, speaking through thcir
elected representatives, have rejected all lorms of state-sanctioned torture."
32

Surrrh, n. I above ar para.50. Emphasis in the original. The condemnation of torture has
been framed in the lollowing terms by another court:

The crack of rvhip. the clarnp of the thumb scrcw, the crush of the iron maiden, and, in these
more eflicicnt modcrn rimes, the shocks of the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the

What is more, the court also found that international law similarly
prescribes an absolute bar on both torture and deportation to torture,
and agreed that this attitude ought to inform their interpretation of
Section 7 of the Charter.In the court's words:
We conclude that the better view is that international law rejects deportations
to torture, eaen where national securiry interests are at slake. This is the norm which
best informs the content of the principles of fundamental justice under s.7 of
the Charrer.33

Somehow, however, the court ends up condoning in e{fect the likely
torture of a refugee who is deported to torture by Canad a in an exceptional case. According to the court:

, . . barring extraordinary circumslances, deportation to torture will generally
violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by s.7 of the Charler.""
international order will not tolerate. To subject a person to such horrors is to commit one of the
most egregious violations of the personal security and dignity of human beings.
See Siderman de Blake u. Republic of Argmtina, 965 F.2d 699, at 7 I 7 (9th Cir. l 992). Similarly, in
Filartiga a. Pma-Irala, 630 F.2d 8i6 (2d Cir. 1980) at 890, the Second Circuit court held that:
Among the rights universally proclaimed by nations . . . is the right to be free o[physical torture.
Indeed, for purposes ofcivil liabitity, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader belore
him hostis humani gcncris, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding today . . . is a small but important
step in the fulfillment of rhe ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.

of torture. For example, see Unfuusa!
Declarationof Human Rrgitr, G.A. Res.2l7, UN GAOR,3d Sess., pt. l, at 71, UN Doc. Al8l0
(1948), [hereinafter UDHR]; Intcrdational Coacnant on Cioil and Political R,g[rr, (1966) 999 UNTS
l7l, UN Doc. ,{/6316 (1966) (entered into lorce March 23, 1976), Art.7, [hereinafter /CCPR];
and the Torturc Conaantion, above n. | 7, Arts 2 and 3 especially.
For scholarly contributions in this regard, see P. v. \\t. l\{agee, 'The United Nations Convention
Several international instruments outlaw the practice

Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: The Bush

Administration's Stance on Torture' ( l99l-92) 25 George Washington Joumal of Intcnntional Laut and
EconomicsS0T; Y. Gery, 'The Torture Victim Protection Act: Raising Isues of Legitimacy' (1993)
26 Ctorge Washington Journal oJ International Law and Economics, 597 at 608; P, Burns
& O. Okafor, 'The United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment or How it is still better to Light A candle than to Curse the
darkness' (1998) 9;2 Otago l.aw Revicw 399 at 405 (the authors observed that: 'The convention
absolutely prohibits torture and makes it punishable as a grave criminal o{Ience. In addition,
torture may not be justified on grounds of any exceptional circumstances u'hacoever');J. Horowitz, 'Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity: Regina v. Barde and the Commissioner of Police lor the lr,letropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet'. Universal Jurisdiction and
Sovereign Immunit;'for Jus Cogzzs \"iolations' (1999) 23 Fordham Inlernational Journal 489 at 509:
K.B. Rosati, 'The United Nations Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative for Asylum
Seekers'(1997) 74:45 INTERRELlTT3at 1783; K.B. Rosati,'The United Nations Convention
against Torture : A Detailed Examination of the Convention as an Alternative for Asylum seekers'
(1997) 97-12 Immigr. Briefings I at 4; A. Boulesbaa,'The Nature of the Obligations Incurred by
States Under Article 2 of the UN Convention Against Torture' (1990) l2 Human Rights fuartnly 53
at 83; P. Burns, 'The United Nations Committee Against Torture And lts Role in Refugee
Protection'(2001) l5 Georgctown Immigration Law Journal 403 at 406; and B. Gorlick,'The Convention and The Convention against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime for Refugees'

lt:3 IJRI.479 at 486.
Ibid. at para. 75.
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This turn, on the part of the court, lrom an absolute condemnation of
torture to a relatiuas, condoning of the practice, albeit in exceptional
cases only, is highly significant given the court's explicit recognition in
the decision that by deporting a refugee to torture, Canada actively
facilitates and condones the torture of that reflugee. In this sense the
court was well aware that Canada was as responsible as any other
country for any act(s) of torture that the deported refugee faced.
According to the court:
We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeal's suggestion that, in expelling
a refugee to a risk of torture, Canada acts only as an involuntary intermediary.
Without Canada's action, there would be no risk of torture. Accordingly, we
cannot pretend. that Canada is merely a passive participant.35

Thus, it is fair to suggest that the preferred image of torture, and
deportation to torture, in the decision is a pragmatically relativist
one
a relativism towards torture that is based on the desire to secure
- from threats to its security. It is a lorm of human rights
Canada
relativism that may usefully be styled security relativism (in order to
isolate it conceptually from classic cultural relativism). This form of
relativism would suggest that a refugee's conduct can present such a risk
to Canada's national security that Canadians, and Canadian courts,
would not and should not in conscience be shocked by her or his
deportation to a place where s/he is likely to be tortured. Put differently, if the court recognizes, as it does, that deporting a refugee to
torture directly implicates Canada in the act of torture itself, then in the
'exceptional cases' in which such a relugee is deported to torture,
Canada's actions cannot but be viewed as suggesting that the person's
plans or actions that threaten Canadian national security are so bad,
and the person is therefore so bad herself, that Canada would facilitate
her torture.
As justifiable as this kind of argument seems at first glance, it is
seriously flau,ed nevertheless. It is similar to the seductive argument
that is too often made in some quarters that Canadians suspected or
convicted of committing serious crimes ought to be dcnied certain
human rights protections, and/or treated less humanely in prison, on
the basis that thcy arc monsters. If the majority of Canadians have
consistently rejected that argument as flawed, the argument that
Canada ought to condone the deportation of a refugee to torture
because of that person's criminal behaviour cannot pass muster eithe r.
It rvould be different, of course, if a refugee is deported in circumstances
in which the risk of torture that s/he faces is very low, and does not pass
the litmus test of measuring up to a substantial risk. It is, hon'ever,
35

Surrrh,

at para. 55. limphasis supplied.

disturbing that the court's decision leaves the door open to deportation
in exceptional cases even when the refugee faces a high risk of torture.
This is evident from the court's adoption of the balancing approach. In
the court's reasoning, the risk of torture must be balanced against the
security risk posed to Canadian national security. The implication then
is that the higher the security risk to Canada the more likely it becomes
that deportation to even certain torture would be viewed as justifiable.
In this way did the court suggest that a substantial risk of torture upon
deportation can be balanced away by the risk that the refugee presumably poses to Canadian national security.
Subtly displaced by the court's instrumentally-driven preferred
image of torture (and deportation to torture) as risks that could be
balanced away, is the alternative image of tortule^as wholfu unacceptableone that cannot be balanced away in this sense.'o As the court acknowledgeE this is the current position under international human rights
law." It is now well accepted, as the court noted, that international
human rights law absolute| prohibits torture or deportations to torture.
Article 3 of the Torture Convention is explicit on this point. As the
Committee Against Torture has itself made clear:
. . . the Act corresponds with article 3 of the Convention against Torture and
states that an alien, who has been refused entry or who shall be expelled, may
never be sent to a country where there is firm reason to believe that he or she
would be in danger of suffering capital or corporal punishment or of being
subjected to torture, nor to a country wheretre is not protected from being sent
to a country where he would be in danger."o

It was in light of this international legal position that in Tahir Hussain
Khan u. Canada,'" the Committee Against Torture (CAT) restrained
Canada from returning Khan to Pakistan where he faced a substantial
risk of torture. Khan was a member of Baltistan Student Federation,
a political movement that is seeking self-determination for Kashmir.
The CAT was satisfied that there existed substantial grounds for believins that he would be subiected to torture should he be returned to
Pa"kista.,.ao ln Tapia Pae<i. Sweden,at a Peruvian national was refused
convention relugee status in Sweden under the exclusion clause of
36

Ap..t from the Torturc Conacnlibn, which prohibits torture unconditionally (particularly in its
Articles 2 and 3), it is noteworthy that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
omirr torture (which is prohibited by its Article 7) lrom the ]ist of derogable human righa listed in
its*{rticle 4(2). See rhe International Coaenant on Ciail and Potitical Rrgrrr (ICCPR), above n. 32.
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Article I F of l95l Convention on the ground that 'he had been armed
and engaged in crimes during his political activities in Peru'.42 His
application not to be returned to Peru where he faces torture was
granted by CAT. The CAT was of the opinion that regardless of the
nature of his activities while in Peru, he came under the protection of
Article 3 of Torture Conaentian and that the nature of his past conduct
was not a relevant consideration under Article 3.43 Alio, in Auedes
Hama2ak Korban o. Sweden,e an Iraqi citizen had sought asylum in
Sweden. He was formerly a resident of Kuwait where he had sought
refuge because of his opposition to Iraqi government. As a result of his
nationality, he was imprisoned three times in Kuwait, tortured, and
eventually deported to Iraq on 22 September 1991.*' On arrival in
Iraq, he was interrogated and later released on the condition that he
would report daily to a government representative. Subsequently, he
managed to escape to Jordan with his farnily. Though his wife was
aJordanian national, the Jordanian authorities refused him a residence
permit. In 1993, he visited Iraq to see his dying mother. On this second
visit, he was again arrested and detained for 14 days. He was later
released on the condition that he would report daily to a government
official in his neighbourhood. He later left Iraq when he learnt that his
safety was at risk there. He travelled back to Jordan and stayed there
for some time without a residence permit. He subsequently travelled on
to Sweden where his son (who deserted from the Iraqi army) resided.
The Swedish Immigration Board rejected his application for asylum o.l
26 September 1994. His deportation from Sweden was later ordered.*"
At the CAT, the applicant contended that his return to Iraq would
contravene Article 3 of the Torture Convention. In his view, he would
likely face torture upon return to Iraq. He further contended that, since
he was not a holder ofJordanian residence permit, it was unsafe for him
to return there, as he faced the risk of being returned to Iraq from
Jordan.aT He supported his application with some letters written by
UNHCR to the Swedish Immigration Board explaining the lact that
persons married toJordanian women \^,ere not given preferential treatment in Jordan in the grant of residence permits. He also tendered
another letter from the UNHCR showing that Iraqis returned lrom
Sweden were routinely denied entry intoJordan.*" In its decisiorl, the
CAT held that the existence of a situation of serious human rights
violations in lraq coupled with the applicant's history of detention in
n2
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that country represented substantial grounds to.believe that he would
be in danger of being tortured on return to lraq.+e The Committee then
recommended that Sweden refrain from returning the applicant to
Jordan because of the risk he faced of being returned to Iraq from
there.su
In the same manner, as the European Court of Human Rights stated

quite clearly:
Article 3[ECHR] enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic
society. . . The court is well aware of the immense di{Iiculties faced by states
in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence.
However, even in these circumstances, the convention prohibits in absolute
terms, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment irrespective
of the victim's conduct . . . Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and
no derogation from it is permissible . . . even in the event ofa public emergency
threatening the life of the nation . . . When substantial grounds have been
shown for believing that an individual would face a risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another state, the responsibility
of the contracting state to safeguard him or her against such treatment is
engaged in the event of the expulsion . . . In these circumstances, the activities
of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous cannot be a
material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than
that provi-4ed by Article 32 and 33 of the UN l95l Convention on the Status of
Refugees."'

What is more, thersupreme court of at least one country has adopted
a similar position.
Similar views have been expressed by Peter Burns, the Canadian
academic who is the current Chair of the CAT. In his view:
The combined e{fects of Articles 1,3 and 22 lof the Torture Convention]

enables individuals to complain directly to the committee that if, having failed
to obtain refugee status, they are sent to or returned to a particular state where
there are substandal grounds to believe that they would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, then for a state to expel or return them would breach the
Torture Convention . . . If they are successful in this claim then euen if they are
terrorists or criminals, they are entitled to the protection of the Torture Convention. Article 3 is non-derogable and cannot be diminished by a state party that

may be influenced by matters of state securitv, international comity or even
domestic politics."

Thus, there is no alchemy) no natural law logic, that directs in f;avour of
the Supreme Court of Canada's preferred image of a substantial risk of
torture as a thing that can at a point be balanced away by a national
ae
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security risk. There is no non-contingent algebra in favour of the court's
position. The court's logic was, thereflore, obviously contingent, at least
in this one respect. What the court did was to make a choice among
competing images of torture and deportation to torture. It was partly
this strategic choice that enabled the court to construct its specific
solutions to the difficult socio-legal problems that were posed to it as
the right answers. Without viewing torture and deportation to torture as
things that could be balanced away, without adopting its balancing
paradigm at all, the court would probably not have been able to

construct a plausible argument for the legality and legitimacy of
a deportation to torture, no matter how extraordinary the specific
circumstances. In this connection, it would be instructive to ponder
upon this question: would the court have resorted as easily to the
balancing paradigm had the substantial risk posed to Mr Suresh by a
possible deportation been his death in a genocidal campaign?

5. The image of international normative authority
in the decision
This section will attempt to tease out and analyse the image of international normative authority that is preferred and developed in the
Suresh decision as rvell as the alternative image of that same construct
that is thus displaced. As in the last section, this article will also attempt
to show how the preferred image worked to constrain the court's legal
reasoning and decision in an unsatisfactory direction and enabled it to
construct a particular contingent solution to the socio-legal problems
posed by the appeal as the right answer. Here the purpose is not
necessarily to show that one conception of international normative
authority is always better than the other, as much as it is to show that
the court's reliance on a particular notion of international normative
authority was as a result of conscious (though subtle) normative choice
on its part, a choice that in turn constrained its conclusions. Credible
alternatives were definitely available to the court.
-fhe image of intcrnational normative authority (more particularly
the image of the authority exerted within Canada by international
human rights norms) that rn'as preferred by the court, is of the same
relatively weak ilk as those that most Canadian courts have generally
subscribed to over the years.5a Indeed, there can be very little doubt, i{'
any at all, regarding the nature of the image of international normative
authority preferred by the court. In this case, the court was at pains to
make it clcar that it does not subscribe to a strong imagc o[the authority
tn
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ofinternational human rights norms over the domestic behaviour of the
Canadian government. According to the court:
In so far as Canada is unable to deport a person where there are substantial
grounds to believe he or she would be tortured on return [except in exceptional cases], this is not be;;ure Article 3 of the CAT directly constrains the actions of thc
Canadiangoaernmmt...

The court's preference was for a weak image of international normative
authority that absolutely excluded the possibility that a treaty such as
the Torture Conamtion could be viewed by a domeslic court of law in
in terrns
Canada as formally binding on the Canadian government
- with the
of directl2 constraining its domestic behaviour. In accordance
practici of most corrrir in most countries,s6 the court constructed international human rights norms as incapable of directly governing domestic governance unless and until such norms are expres-s_ly incorporated
into the domestic legal order by national legislation." The court felt
able to maintain this position despite the f;act that the international
human rights obligations in question, specified as they are^in a treaty
that Canada had ratified, werefreely assumed by Canada."o
Correctly in our view, the court also developed and relied on an
image of international human rights norms as prescriptions that, even
in the absence of their formally binding quality, ought to exert some
constructs
cultural influence on the reasoning of Canadian courts
that must inform the search for the meaning of the provisions of
Canada's domestic (human rights) legislation.Se Flowever, given the
nature of its reasoning in the present case, it is apparent that the court's
conception of the level of cultural influence that these norms may exert
on Canadian courts is relativelv weak and limited as well. For instance,
]] S.. Surcsh, n. I above at para. 7B. Emphasis added.
"o H.M. Kindred cl al., Intemationa! Lau ChieJlT as Intztprclcd and Applied in Canada,6th edn.,
Ca_nada: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited,2000) at 167, 168 &.233-245.
Surcsh, n. I above at para.60.
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at para.66.
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On th" question ol rhe cultural influence o[intemational human rights norms within domestic
social and legal orders, see M. Mutua, 'Book Review' (2001) 95 AJIL255.ln this regard, Professor
IWutua has noted quite correctly that:

that is, where
The true test for the effectiveness of human rights lau'is not at the vertical level
and
but rather in the assimilation
international institutions act on domestic legal orders
- from this perspective, human rights
adoption of human rights norms by and n'ithin states. Seen
norms have had an almost miraculous impact on the psyches of states, cultures, and societies
around the world (at 256).
For a book-length ethnographic study that reaches similar conclusions with respect to one regional
human rights regime, see O.C. Okafor, Do International Human Rights Inslilutiorc Matler? Thc Influncc
of the ACHPR within Nigeia (forthcoming). In this connection, see also T. Risse, S. Ropp, and K.
Sikkink, eds., The Pouer o! Human Rights: Intcnational Norms and Domcslic Ciazga (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1999). For different perspectives, see T. Evans, ed., Human Rights
FiJg Tcars On: A Reapprartal (N{anchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); P. Baehr, Human

the court explicitly recognized the absolute nature of the Torture Conproliibition against deportations to torture,60 and yet felt able
to hold that its interpretation of Canadian law must leave open the
possibility of deportations to torture, albeit in exceptional cases. Here,
there is clearly a disjuncture between the position adopted by Canadian
law and the legal requirement of at least one international human
rights norm. Q,gite obviously therefore, while significant and thus
laudable in itself, the extent of the cultural influence exerted on the
court's reasoning by international law, was relatively weak and limited.
lVere the court to have been influenced more strongly, were its image of
the cultural influence of international norms much sronger, it could
have adopted the same position as under the Torture Convention, that
is, it could have upheld an absolute bar on deportations to torture.
Rather, the court chose to displace alternative, if significantly stronger,images of formal international normative authority. Displaced from
the court's reasoning process was an alternative image of freej assumed
treaty obligations as in some way lormally binding on, and/or directly
constraining ol, domestic governments, even when not re-enacted by
local legislation. Unpopular among most domestic courts as it admittedly is, this is no longer a revolutionary conception of international
normative authority at all. Ordinarily, domestic law has accepted the
dual applicability of EU legislation and the ECJ's status is unique."'
The court's of a number of countries have for long recognized the
concept of self-executing treaties that often apply direct[t within their
respective states.o' The Nigerian Court of Appeal has held, on one
occasion at least, that the AJrican Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
applieddirectly to constrain the behaviour of a contemporary military
regime."' Though later overruled in some respects by the Nigerian
Supreme Court,b+ this decision, as well as the other instances already
canvassed, aptly illustrate the f,act that this alternative conception is not
so naive or beyond the pale that it could not have been developed and
relied on by Supreme Court of Canada in the Suresh case. As the
Nigerian Court of Appeal must have recognized, the hiatus between
the adoption of a treaty by a state and that state's ratification of the
same treaty provides an opportunity for it to refrain from becoming
bound by a treaty it does not intend to directly govern its activities. In
uention's

Rights: Uniaersality in Practicc (Ncrr York: St. tr'lartin's Press, 1999); and J.S. lVatson, Thcory and
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this way is the state's sovereign autonomy preserved. There is then very
little compelling policy reasons why such a more monist scheme should
not be adopted. In the end, the court lost yet another opportunity to
take the lead globally in this respect.
Displaced as well from the court's reasoning process was an alternative, stronger, way of imagining the cultural influence of international human rights norms on a court's reasoning process. Admittedly,
as long as an international norm does not lorrnally bind a domestic
court, that court is strictly speaking well within its rights not to apply
that norm or not to apply it fully. However, the fact remains that if a
court agrees that such international norms should nevertheless exert a
cultural influence on its'interpretation of the relevant domestic laws,
that court is faced with a number of alternative-ways of conceptualising
its receptiveness to these strictly non-binding norms. The alternatives
range from complete receptiveness to a very low level of receptiveness.
In the Suresh case, the court preferred something in between these two
points on the spectrum of receptivity. It chose a level of receptiveness
that is significantly high yet disturbingly incomplete. It chose to receive
only in part the categorical and absolute prohibition of deportation to
however large the
torture under international human rights norms
part that it received was. There was a clear gap, a- hiatus, on this point
between the court's position and the international legal position. This
disjuncture could only have been possible because the court preferred a
limited, weaker, alternative image of the cultural authority of international human rights norms within domestic legal orders.
It was only by skilfully displacing these two stronger and alternative
images of the formal and cultural authority of international human
rights norms that the court could create the necessary conditions lor it
to reach its highly consequential conclusion that Canadian law could
authorize or allow a deportation to torture in exceptional cases. Had it
found that international human rights norms were formalj binding on
Canadian domestic institutions and thus constrained these institutions
directly, or that it was otherwise informally obligated to receive completeQ the prohibition of deportations to torture under international
human rights law, it would have been extremely diflicult, if not impossible, for rhe court to come to the conclusion that it did.

6. The image of state sovereignty in the decision
This section will attempt to tease out and analyse the image of state
sovereignty that is preferred in theSzrasidecision as well as the alternative
image of that same phenomenon that is thus displaced. As in the preceding sections of this article, we will show how the preferred image
worked to constrain the court's legal reasoning and decision, and

enabled it to construct a particular contingent and unsatisfactory
solution to the socio-legal problems posed by the appeal as the right
answer. The purpose is not necessarily to show that one conception of
state sovereignty is better than the other, as much as it is to show that
the court's reliance on a particular notion of state sovereignty was as a
result of normative choice that in turn consrained its conclusions in a
particular direction. Credible alternatives were available to the court.
By implication then, if another credible conception ofstate sovereignty
was also available lor the court to choose from, then at least one other
'right answer' to the major questions posed to the court was both
possible and viable.
The image ofstate sovereignty that the court preferred is entailed by,
and discernible from, its subscription in the decision to a relatively weak
conception of international normative authority within domestic legal
orders, one that effectively subordinates international norms to local
legislation. In this decision, the court toed a line that was very close to
the same absolutist srong conception of state sovereignty that has in the
past received much censure mainly (but not exclusively) fromthe vast
majority of (mainly) western political leaders and institutions.o" While
the court did not articulate explicitQ its subscription to this specific
conception of state sovereignty, its adoption of that position is easily
discerned lrom its reasoning process. One passage from the court's
judgment is particularly instructive. According to the court:
Our concern is not r,"ith Canada's international ohligations
international law . . . lir not] controlling in itself.oo

qua

obligations . . .

Clearly, in the court's view, despite the fact that Canada had freely
assumed certain international legal obligations, these international
norms did not and could not goaern its responses to the questions
posed to it. According to the court, these norms could only act as
interpretive aids to be used to the extent the court wished. The court
lvas not, in its view, obliged to apply these international human rights
norms. Clearly, as well, the basis for this conclusion was the presumed
autonomy (read sovereignty) of the Canadian legal order ais-a-uis the
international legal order. This strong assertion of autonomy has of
colrrse always been based on the dualist rather than monisl conception
of the relationship between a domestic Iegal order and the international
Iegal order.o' I{ore importantly, the court vierved the Canadian lcgal
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order as virtually shielded by the concept of state sovereignty from
the direct governance of international norms. We do not necessarily
disagree with the deployment of sovereignty as a conceptual shield
against foreign or international control, but seek to render explicit the
court's strong pro-sovereignty posture in the face of perceived national
emergency in Canada.
Displaced from the courts reasoning therefore was an alternative
weaker conception of state sovereignty, one that Canadian and other
western governments have promoted for decades as the panacea for
most of the human rights and economic problems of the weaker Third
World states, one that allows much more room for the penetration of
foreign and international legal, economic, political, and social norms
and power into the domestic orders of states.ou Thus, in the view of the
Canadian government, this weak conception of state sovereignty has
always been a credible and viable alternative to the virtually absolute
or stiong image of state sovereignty.6s Muny serious and respected
scholars also prefer this alternative image of state sovereignty.'uAs this
is not a treatise on state sovereignty, " there is no need go into more
detail regarding the nature of these conceptions, but suflice it so say that
given its historical popularity in mostly (but not exclusively) western
government and academic circles, the existence and nature of this weak
image of state sovereignty could not have been unknown to the court.
As such, its preference in this situation, for the strong version of state
sovereignty was clearly a conscious normative choice.
It was only by carefully and subtly displacing this weak conception of
state sovereignty in lavour of a much stronger alternative that the court
could plausibly refuse to accept the complete authority of freely assumed
international human rights norms regarding the prohibition of deportation to torture within Canada's domestic legal order, and reject the
notion that this issue was governed directly by those international
human rights norms. And once the court could make a plausible
argument that it was not obliged or strictly required to follow the
dictates of these international human rights, it created space for it to
substitute its own dffirentjudgment as to the legality of such deporta-
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tions. Such a different judgment would not have been possible had it
subscribed to the weak conception of state sovereignty, and thus
allowed that its decision was in this case governed directly by international norms. In that event, it would have most likely been forced to
find other than as it did.

7

. The image of the institutional

culture of the

Canadian immigration bureaucracy in the decision
This section will attempt to tease out and analyse the image of the
institutional culture of the Canadian immigration bureaucracy (as
represented primarily by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration or CICi2) that was impliedly developed, preferred and relied on
(directly or indirectly) in the Suresh decision.
Implied strongly all through the court's judgment is a relatively
benign image of CIC's institutional culture as primarily objective
rather than basically biased in favour of the exclusion of prospective
immigrants and refugees lrom Canada. That this was the dominant
image of that institutional culture that operated within and helped to
govern the court's reasoning process is evident lrom the nature of the
court's conclusions and the structure of its logic. For instance, the court
lelt able to hold that the crucial 'threshold finding' of whe ther a refugee
or other person would face a substantial risk of torture ifdeported to the
state(s) to which they are deportable was the Ntlinister's (read CIC's) to
make, and that such decisions, once made by the Minister, should enjoy
the highest possible level of deference. In practice, the Minister's decision would be extremely diflicult to overturn primarily because the
court lound that, after weighing all the relevant lactors that must be
considered in deciding the standard of review with regard to a particular administrative decision, the appropriate standard of review with
regard to the Minister's decisions regarding the deportation of refugees
or othcr persons at risk to torture, was that the decision must not be
disturbed unless it is shown to be ltatently unreasonable. This is the
stanclard of deference that allows the most possible discretion (short of
absolutism) to the N4inister. In such situations, the reviewing court
cannot se t the N{inister's decision aside even 'if it rvould have r,"eighed
the lactors differently and arrived at a di{ferent conclusion'." The
72
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rationale that was o{fered by the Supreme Court for allowing such a
high degree ofdeference to the Minister's decision in such cases was that
the issues to be considered and factors to be weighed (by the Minister),
such as the human rights record of the home state and the personal risk
to the person to be deported, were'largely outside the realm ofexpertise
of reviewing courts and possess a negligible legal dimension'.'"
Acknowledging that the court came to this conclusion after a thoughtful consideration of the issue of the 'appropriate standard of deference?,
it would seem that given the extremely severe repercussions lor a person
at risk, of a mistaken, negligent or wrong decision (usually death, or
torture), the court's preparedness to allow such an extremely high level
of virtually non-reviewable discretion to the Minister must have been
premised on a much more benign image of CIC than many otherjudges
and scholars have been prepared to allow." Since there is no suggestion
of bad faith on the part of the court, it only makes sense to conclude that
the court felt able to allow such an exremely high level of discretion to
the Minister (CIC in effect) in relation to such a serious highly consequential matter, because the court expected (or preferred to expect)
that, in reaching such decisions, the CIC would mostly behave and act
in an objective, unbiased, way
thus reducing to the barest minimum
- deportations to torture. The court
the risk of mistaken or negligent
must have imagined that it was allowing such great powers to a CIC
that is nol systemically biased, one that is not characterized by zn
institutional culture that is biased in favour of exclusivist or restrictive
immigration practices. Otherwise, the risk of a mistaken or negligent
deportation would be too great to ignore. Surely, mindful as the court
was of its lormal duty to consider the lactors that determine the nature
of the standard of review, the court would not have been unmindful, at
least informally, of the question of the workability in practice of the
judicial review scheme that it was crafting, a scheme that was, after all,
broadly designed to prevent the deportation of a relugee who faces a
substantial risk of torture. Thus, the proper and just administration of
the court's scheme cannot but be significantly tied to the existence of a
a CIC that does
CIC that is mostly unbiased (in the systemic sense)
not view its primary mission as the securement of Canada's borders
{rom a real or imagined deluge of migrants and refugees. Otherwise the
scheme would fail in the sense that a biased CIC would tend to act in
ways that would result in the deportation of too many people to torture
on too many occasions. In this sense then, did a mostly benign image of
CIC's institutional culture frame the court's conclusions here.
para.39.
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While this benign view of CIC's dominant institutional culture
would be much welcome were it in fact accurate, such an image is
regrettably unrealistic lor the most part. An alternative and perhaps
more realistic image of CIC's institutional culture, which views it much
benignly, was displaced by the court's sub-textual subscription to a
mostly benign image of that same phenomenon. It has now become
quite clear to most observers of that agency that, as a number of
Canadian judges and scholars have observed, CIC's dominant institutional culture has not, for the most part, been biased in favour of the
facilitation of the entry or admission of foreigners to Canada (as
opposed to being biased in favour of the restriction of the entry of
these foreigners).76 It is in fact, on the balance, biased in favour of the
exclusion of refugees from Canada. A few instances of this kind of
systemic bias will suffice to illustrate this point. First of all, it is well
known that CIC (on behalf of Canada) usually recommends and
implements the imposition of travel visa restrictions on the citizens of
a country as soon as that country begins to produce a significant
number of refugee claimants in Canada." lts clear intention in those
cases was to keep out possible relugees lrom reaching Canada. As the
Canadian Council of Refugees has noted:
less

There is a correlation between the imposition of the visa requirement by
Canada and the kinds of human rights abuses that causes refugees to flee.
The worse the human rights abuses, the more likely the country is to have a
visa requirement imposed on it. When refugee claimants start arriving in
Canada lrom a country without a visa requirement, the government generally
puts a visa requirement on the country, whether or not thc claimants are in
fact reftrgees. An example of this occurred in 1997, when there was an increase
in arrivals of Roma claimants from Czech Republic, leading to the reimposition of the visa requirement, despite the f,act that there was ample
evidence that Roma were suflering serious human rights abuses in the Czech
Republic. Canada uscs the visa requirement to stop persecuted people from
finding protection in Canada.'"

Secondly, it is also trite knowledge that CIC makes every effort to
prevent the arrival in Canada of refugee claimants who attempt to
76
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circumvent the visa requirement. As one Canadian newspaper noted a
few years ago:
Canadian immigration oflicials are now daily boarding international flights
arriving in Vancouver [and other major Canadian airports] in an effort to
catch people entering the country on_ false documents. The procedure has
already resulted in fines to the airlines bringing them here"'

It is such activities that have prompted two important Canadian
refugee law scholars to point out the unfortunate, even tragic, paradox
entailed in the fact that:
Although Canada is home to only about one-half of one percent of the world's
refugees, it [CIC included] apparently sees no inconsistency between active
participation in a program of deflection and its vaunted commitment to
international burden sharing.ou

Again, in Baker u Canada,Bl the Supreme Court of Canada noticed the
blatantly expressed bias (at least on the part of one officer) in f;avour of
restrictive immigration practices that was exhibited by the relevant
CIC immigration officer. In that case, the notes of the oflicer who
examined Ms. Baker in respect of her application for permanent residence in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate (H & C)
grounds clearly indicated a manifest exclusionary bias, and manifest
disregard for the plight of a person in need and who clearly deserved
compassion. The note, which was in the nature of a recommendation to
a superior oflicer, read as follows:
The PC is paranoid schizophrenic and on welfare. She has no qualifications
other than as a domestic. She has FOUR CHILDREN INJAMAICA AND
ANOTHER FOUR BORN HERE. She will, ofcourse, be a tremendous strain
on our social welfare systems for (probably) the rest of her life. There are
no H&C f;actors other than her FOUR CANADIAN-BORN CHILDREN.
Do we let her stay because of that? I am of the opinion that Canada can no
longer afford this kind of generosity.s2

lVhile it is conceded that bias on the part of one CIC officer does not
mean there is systemic bias, it is contended that such a systemic bias
exists. Apart from the other instances already recounted in this connection, the broad reaction of CIC to the Supreme Court of Canada's
highly liberal decision in the Baker case, setting aside the earlier decisions of CIC and the lower courts, is highly instructive for our present
t9 S""
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purposes. While Ms. Baker was eventually granted permanent residence in Canada, and while the lower federal courts have attempted
to follow the Supreme Court of Canada's lead, CIC has, as an institution, been highly resistant to a broad-based concrete implementation of
the legal position adopted by the court in the case. As Sharryn Aiken
and Sheena Scott have observed:
Nevertheless, it is certainly evident that the federal court is attempting to
respond to the implications of the S.C. decision. In contrast, the immigration
bureaucracy [read CIC] has resisted any direct engagement with the ruling.
Nine months after the court's decision, the department has not integrated the
ruling into operational guidelines and appears to be committed to restricting
the scope of its application. An internal memorandum issued in September
1999 from Ontario region concerning the removal o[ persons with pending
H & C applications is indicative of the department's approach. The memorandum indicates that the removal officers should "exercise good judgement
when prioritizing their removal workload" and that barring any exceptional
circumstances where deferral may be justified pending H & C application,
removalshould "proceed in the normal manner." The memo fails to make any
mention of the best interests of children as a relevant lactor in the oflicer's
exercise of "good judgement" nor is there any indication that the Baker ruling
might have implications for the manner in which removal decisions are made.83

This is not to argue, of course, either that CIC as an institution, or
individual CIC oflicers, are either totally incapable of objectivity or
have for the most part deliberately acted in bad faith toward prospective refugees or immigrants within or without Canada. The point that
has been made is that it is because this large bureaucracy has evidently
(and somewhat understandably) conceived of itself primarily as gatekeepers of a Canada that they see as under siege by a deluge of
prospective refugee and migrants, as the agency responsible for excluding those that Canada's immigration/refugee lau'would not admit to
Canada, that its broadly dominant institutional culture has tended to
assume a bias toward the restriction of entry rather than the facilitation
of admission. lVhile both tendencies are of course reflected in CIC's
institutional culture, the restrictive tendency has tended to dominate.
By displacing sub-textually this much less benign and, in our vien',
rnuch more realistic primary image of CIC's institutional culture , the
court was able to embrace the more benign understanding of CIC, thus
rendering its decision to allow in e{fect an extremely high level of
discretion to CIC in deciding that a person does or does not face a
substantial risk of torture (and/or that slhe is or is not a danger to
national security) much more convincing than it r.r.ould have been had
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the court formed or privileged an alternative and much less benign
image of that institution's systemic culture. Given that one ofthe factors
that guides the court's decisions regarding the standard of deference it
deems appropriate is the purpose of the legislation (including in this
case, a consideration of the extent of the risk faced by the prospective
deportee), had the court relied on the less benign image of CIC's
dominant institutional culture (had it as a result become more deeply
cognizant of the likelihood that the balancing process through which
CIC decides if it should deport a refugee to torture may too olten and

become seriously deflected by . systemic institutional culture that
favours restrictions on the entry of foreigners to Canada), the court
may not have been as convinced of the appropriateness of allowing the
highest available level of discretion to the Minister (read CIC). Again,
had the court not relied as much as it did on the more benign image of
CIC's institutional culture, it may not have been as convinced of the
appropriateness of allowing, as it did, the normative opening in favour
of deportations to torture (in exceptional cases). For the court would
have displayed more awareness of the ways in which the CIC's dominant institutional culture favouring a more restrictive or exclusionary
approach to immigration/refugee decision making would eventually
lead to the subversion in far too many concrete cases of the court's
general normative prohibition against deportations to torture. In practice, since the CIC's finding that a person does not face a substantial
risk of torture on deportation will be very difficult to overturn in the
courts, by simply ensuring that it weighs all the correct factors, and
then finding upon some grounds (however weak these may seem to a
refugee advocate) that the prospective deportee does not face a subslantial risk of torture upon return, the CIC can almost always cause the
deportation of a person to torture, even in those cases where it is clear to
most people that the person laces some risk oftorture. After all, it may be
argued, not every risk of torture can be described as substantial. In this
caJe, CIC can act in good faith and yet be completely wrong. Its
knowledge and understanding of the situations in the often very distant
lands that it is called upon to comment on has not always been as
inspiring of confidence as it should. Yet unless it is proven to have acted
in bad f;aith or arbitrarily, or there is no evidence to support its finding,
or it lailed to consider the appropriate factors, the courts cannot overturn its finding. It is also not unlikely at all that, far too often, CIC's
decision-making may be inflected by its broad institutional bias in
favour of the exclusion of refugee and prospective refugee-claimants
from Canada. [n the past, it has been extremely di{ficult to meet the
extremely high standard necessary to convince a Canadian court to
overturn an immigration decision that is shielded by such a highly
deferential standard of review as is now enjoyed by the Minister in

respect of her or his decisions to deport a refugee who may face a risk of
toriure abroad.Ba As (then Professor, now Judge) John Evans has
observed, Canadian judges have always undisguisedly shown deference
to specialist Administrative Tribunals [and institutions] charged with
the responsibility of administrating a particular programme.B5 While
showing deference to the decision of the Minister (read CIC) should not
entail surrendering the court's supervisory powers,"" in practice the
patently unreasonable standard has in the past served as a virtually
impenetrable shield. Given CIC's broadly dominant pro-exclusionary
institutional bias, the current legal position is hardly reassuring from
the point of view of many prospective deportees at risk of torture.
Laudable as it ordinarily seems, it may continue to license the deportation of persons at risk of torture to the very places that they are at risk.

B. The emergent Canadian
regime

nan-refoulement

the theory and the practice

The foregoing sections of this article, attempted to explicate the various
subtle ways in which the court developed, deployed, and relied on otherwise contingent images ofCanadian national security, torture and deportations to torture, international normative authority, state sovereignty,
and the institutional culture of the Canadian immigration bureaucracy, and displaced alternative (and perhaps even more viable) images
of these constructs and phenomena, thereby constraining its reasoning
process in one particular unsatisfactory direction, and presenting its
an answer
particular overarching conclusion as the right answer
- and other
that, arguably falls short of the protection needs of refugees
persons at risk.
The present section will have a slightly different focus. Relying on
many of the insights presented in the previous sections of this article, as
well as on the pre-existing literature, this section will attempt to articulate the outlines of Canada's emergent, post-,Silresh case, non-refoulement
connecting its conceptual framework to credible projections
regime
as to its concrete, practical implications. The principal objective is to
relate the conclusions reached by the cclurt in that case to the concrete
circumstances that might be aflected and governed by its legal logic,
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B.l The principle of non-refouletnent
Professor

Guy Goodwin-Gill has described the principle of

non-

refoulemmt as a fundamental basis of international refugee law.o' This
principle precludes a state from returning a person against her or hjs

will where slhe would be persecuted or face the risk of persecution.""
The principle is now widely regarded as a norm of customary international law that binds all states whether or not they are parties to the
Conventio.r.Be It is enunciated in Article 33(l) of the i95t Refrgee
Convention. This provision prohibits states from taking any measure(s)
that would lead to the return of a refugee to the place where that
refugee's life or lreedom would be threatened. It is suggested that any
measure at all that leads to this outcome will constitute a violation of
the principte of non-refoultment.eo However, Article 33 of the Refugee
Conuention permits an exception to this prohibition in cases where a
relugee clearly constitutes a danger to the security of the country of
refuge or where the refugee has been convicted of a serious crime and
.o.trtit,rt.s a danger to the community of that country.sl
This fundamental international refugee law norm has been incorporated into Canadian refugee law by Section 53(1) of the current
Canadian Immigration Act of l97B (the old Act), and Section 115
of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001 that
came into effect inJuly 2002 (the new Act). The Supreme Court of
Canada recently acknowledged the lact of Article 33's incorporation
into Canadian law in Pushpanathan t The Minister of Citiaenship and
Immigration.e2

8.2 The pre-Suresh legal position
Prior to the decision of the court in the Suresh case, the non-rdoulement
regime under Canadian refugee law seemed to tally somewhat closely
with the position under Article 33 of the Refugee Conaention. Construed in
the narrow way in which it has been read by many courts as well as by
the Canadian immigration bureaucracy, the Canadian law relating to
non-refoulemenlwas that while, in general, relugees could not be deported
to places where they faced the risk of persecution, they could be so
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deported when they either posed a serious threat to the national security of the state of refuge. In this narrow and literal view of the law, just
as the plain text of Article 33 of the Rdugee Conuention did not categorically reject deportation to torture, on its face Section 53(l) of the old
Act leaves the door open for Canada to deport those refugees and other
persons in need of protection in respect of whom there are reasonable
grounds to believe that they have committed certain serious crimes
(such as terrorism and espionage) specified under sections l9(l)(e),
(0,(S),0),(k) or (l) of the old Act, and against whom the Minister has
issued a certilicate to the effect that they constitute dangers to the
security of Canada. Those who preferred this narrow view of the nonrefoulement regime in Canada were either minded to virtually ignore
Article 3 of the Torture Canuention and Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), or preferred to construe those provisions in ways that strictly restricted their ambit and import in relation
to Section 53(l) of the old Act.
It was this kind of restrictive interpretation that the Federal Court of
Appeal of Canada preferred in its own (now overruled) decision in the
Suresh case." That court had held that not only did the Refugee Conaention not bar the deportations of refugees to torture (in cases in which
they posed a serious security risk to Canada), the Torture Conuenlion must
be read as not intending to limit the freedom allowed to states to deport
refugees to torture under the Rdugee Conuention, but as permitting such
deportations. That court also held that while the deportation of a
refugee to torture would violate Section 7 of the Charter, it would be
saved by Section I of that same legislation. Assuch, prior to the Suresh
decision, it seemed that the general legal position was that a person who
the l\4inister had certified as a danger to the security of Canada and
who lell into one or more of the serious criminality classes specified
under Section l9 of the old Act, could be deported to the place where
s/he was deportable notuithstanding that it was clear to the Minister that
slhefaced a serious risk of ltersecution in that place, such as a substantial risk of
torture. This position was justified on the basis of residual freedom
allowed to states under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Conuention, and by
the lact that such an action would not shock the conscience ol Canadians to an extcnt that would render it impermissible undel Section 7 of
the Charter. After all, it was argued, the prospective deportee would be a
threat to the security of the nation. It must be remembered that in the
Suresh case, the relevant immigration oflicer and the Minister had
explicitly noted that Mr Suresh would probably f,ace a substantial
risk of torture if deported to Sri Lanka, yet the Minister had still
proceeded to make a deportation order against him. Undoubtedly
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therefore, the Minister had felt that it was well within her legal rights to
deport a refugee to a place where s/he faced a substantial risk of torture
once that person is viewed on reasonable grounds to pose a risk to the
security of Canada. Instructively, both the Federal Court (Trial Division) and the Federal Court of Appeal upheld this view of the nature of
Canada's non-r doulement regime.

8.3 The forrnal legal position post-suresh
If this was the nature of the pre-Suresh Canadian non-rdoulement regime
(at least as interpreted by the Court ofAppeal) the formal legal position
was altered, conceptually at least, by the Suresh decision. Clearly, post
I I January 2002 Suresh decision, the Minister can no longer, in general,
feel authorized by law to order the deportation of a refugee or other
person in need of protection to a place where the targeted person would
face a substantial risk of torture even when she has certified that person
as posing a danger to the security of Canada. Thus, Canadian refugee
law has acknowledged in this general (but limited) way the categorical
bar imposed on deportation to torture by the Torture Conuention. Canadian refugee law has also rejected the notion that the ambit of the nonrefoulemml exception under Article 33(2) of the Refugee Conaention has
been left largely unrestricted by the entry into force of the Torture
Conuention (with its absolute prohibition of torture and deportation to
torture). Clearly, at least under Canadian law, Article 33(2) must now
be construed as much more resrictive of the ability of states to deport
refugees. No longer can most deportations to torture be justified by
simple reference to that treaty provision. This cannot but be so given
the absolute bar on deportation to torture under the Torture Conaention,
and given the fact that, as the court noted in Suresh, the Torture Conuenterm that cannot but
lion affords this protection to everyon
include ref.rgees.9a And so, refugees and other persons at risk of torture
are in general now virtually insulated from deportation to those places
where they face a substantial risk of torture. However, those refugees
and refugee claimants who do not face a substantial risk of torture in the
place(s) to r.r,hich they are deportable are still generally deportable to
such places if they are found to be national security risks under the procedure that is impliedly rnandated by Section 53(l)(b) of the old Act.
However, even at the formal legal level, the emergent Canadian nonrefoulement regime does not still absolutely prohibit deportation to torture, such phenomena are prohibited in general only. A refugee who
faces a substantial risk of torture may still be deported to torture in
those exceptional cases where her deportation would not oflend either
9a
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Section 7 (the principles of fundamental justice) or I (general saving
clause) of the Charter. While the court did not offer any concrete
examples of the kinds of scenarios that would fit within this exceptional
power to deport to torture, it is reasonably safe to suppose that only
persons who pose the most serious of threats to Canada, and in respect
of whom the Minister is of the opinion that only deportation can
assure the security of the realm, would easily fit within this exceptional
category.
Thus, at the conceptual and formal legal level, Section 53(l)(b) of
the old Act is now limited in its application to just two broad groups of
otherwise deportable refugees: persons who do not lace a substantial
risk of torture in the place to which chey are deportable, and persons who
although they face such a risk are still deportable because they pose so
great a risk to Canadian national security that their deportations would,
regardless of their possible torture upon expulsion, not offend either
section 7 or I of the Charter. The net cast by this new section 53(l ) (b) as
modified by the decision in Suresh is still a relativelv wide one.

8.4. The probable concrete legal situation post-Suresh
Given the extremely high level of delerence that the courts have in
practice shown to the decisions of the lt4inister in this connection,
decisions that are shielded by so rvide a standard of review as the
patently unreasonable test. More particularly, three critical decisions
that will affect the concrete workings of Canada's emergent nozrefoulement regime are each shielded quite strongly by this virtually
insurmountable standard of review. These decisions are as follows:

(i)

(ii)
(iii)

The

the Minister's threshold decision that a rcfugee or other person in
need of protection would face a substantial risk of torture if
re turned to the place to which s/hc is removable (rhe substantial
risk decision).
the N4inister's decisiorr that a person is a danger ro rhe securit,v of
Canada (the danger decision).
the Minister's dccision that alter balancing rhe threat posed by
the prospective deportce to Canada's sccurity against the risk
s/he faccs upon deportation to the place wliere shc is deportablc,
she must order the deportation of that pe rson to that place, on
the basis that in the circumstances the person's deportation
would not oflend either Section 7 or I of the Charter (the final
deportation decision).
ne

t eflect of thc shield that the court has allowed the Minister in

these three cases is that in all too many instances. the N4inister can make

each of these decisions with relatively little reasonable apprehension of
her decision being overturned by the courts. In the past, Canadian
courts have overturned only an extremely tiny percentage of administrative immigration decisions that are shielded by such stringent standards o[ revifw.ss
As such, in the vast majority of cases, in cases in which the extent of
the risk of torture faced by the prospective deportees will not always be
as clear as it was in the Suresh case, the Minister will stitl be as free to
deport persons s/he views as threats to the security of Canada as s/he
was before the Suresh decision, even in those cases when the prospective
deportee may in lact face a substantial risk of torture. Even though such
an action would ordinarily offend the logic of the Suresh decision, it
would still be possible
even probable. After all, the Minister's
decision in each of these cases is not legally required to be correct.
The only stricture that it has to face is that it must have been judiciously
reached
that is, that it not be patently unreasonable. Such borderline deportations
to torture can happen in cases where the Minister
concludes that while the prospective deportee may lace some risk of
torture, the level of risk that s/he faces does not rise to the level of a
substantial risk of torture so as to generally preclude her or his deportation. Such borderline deportations to torture can also occur when the
Minister admits that the person faces a substantial risk of torture upon
return but finds that the facts of the case lend themselves to the
conclusion that her or his deportation is warranted when the risk to
Canada's security is balanced against the substantial risk of torture
posed to the person by the deportation. In this last case, the balancing
may be under Section 7 of the Charter (principles of fundamenral
justice) or under Section I of the Charter (the general saving clause of
that legislation). Given the restrictive institutional culture of the agency
that guides the Minister's decisions in such situations
their tendency
to be biased in lavour of exclusivist and restrictive immigration
practices
and given the post-September I I rise in xenophobia within the
- it is not unreasonable to imagine that, regardless of any subpolity,
stantial risk of torture, in more cases than not, the Minister will be
minded to find ways of deporting those s/he views as serious threats to
Canada's national security. Surely, an elected politician sucl.r as the
Minister could not afford to be unmindful of the nature of the prevalent
political climate in contemporary Canada. The chances of the N{inister
being a{fected by the political climate are much improved by the f;act
that her decisions are usually guided by the decisions made by CICdecisions that we have already characterized as too often influenced by
systemic exclusionary bias.
e5 See
D. Bagambiire, n. 84 above at 237 and 258.

9.

Conclusions
Acknowledging all along the fact that the decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Suresh decision was, for the most part, laudable,
what this article did was to articulate, document, and demonstrate two
overarching and inter-related critiques o[this decision. The first of rhe
two broad arguments was that the conclusions reached by the court
were not altogether unassailable given the contingency of the doctrinal
and policy constructs on which they were premised. It was only
through a sophisticated and largely unjustified process of displacemenr
(of alternative and compering images of the relevant constructs) that
the court was able to present these conclusions as the right answer to the
difficult questions posed to it. In this way was the court's reasoning
constrained in ways that are, on balance, unsatisfactory. After al[, there
is no alchemy
no algebra
that inexorably lavours the positions
- ethically and legally credible
adopted by the- court. Even more
alternatives were available to it. By ignoring those credible alternatives, the
court stopped far short of constructing a non-refoulement regime that
could ensure the protection of refugees and other persons at risk from
being deported to places where they are tikely to be tortured. The
objection that this was not possible to do because the law cannot and
should not speak in absolutes is, as we have shown, rather unconvincing
because the law already does absolutej prohibit the deportation of
Canadian born threats to national security- what is more, their deportation to torture. As has been shown, the formalist distinction between
citizen and non-citizen on this score is hardly reassuring to those in lear
of terrorism. Neither is it e thically or substantively coherent.
In addition, for a number of connected reasons (especially those
related to the court's grant of an extremely high level of extremely
hard-to-review discretion to the Minister, and the systemic exclusionary bias of the Canadian immigration bureaucracy), that regime is
likely to be more or less ineffective in practice, in terms of actually
being applied in ways that ensurc that the vast majority of those persons
at risk of torture are not deported to places where they lace a substantial
risk of torturc.
\'Vhile the Suresh decision is definitell' laudable, ar leasr lor the most
part, and while that decision rvill likely serve Mr Suresh himself well,
refugees and other persons at risk, as w,ell as refugee scholars, lawyers
and activists, may most likely find in the coming months and years that
the Suresh decision may not provide as much succour and relief as could
be expected. Thus, even though the non-refoulement norm is being reconfigured in Canada (mostly firr the better), in practical terms, the
results are not likely to be satislactory in the long run.

